

virtue, even when the virtuous agent is a member of another species--he/she will work to obtain the benefits of medical interventions in ways that are not damaging to animals.

Readers of Frey's Rights, Killing and Suffering will recognize in my description of the virtuous parent a version of his "concerned individual." As Frey sees it, if you're convinced of the wrongfulness of current methods of meat production, you needn't become a moral vegetarian. It is better, because it's more efficient in rectifying abuses, to become a "concerned individual" who lobbies against objectionable practices while still enjoying the benefits of eating meat. I think Frey's application of this notion to the issue of diet is mistaken; he doesn't even consider the effectiveness of joining the vegetarian and concerned-individual strategies and greatly overestimates the significance of the human interests involved. But the interests involved in the preservation of life and the restoration of health are among the most profound we have.

Does any of this refute the charge that my virtuous parent is really just another speciesist? Frey's strategy escapes such a charge, I think; his text implies that if retarded humans were being factory farmed, he would find nothing wrong with simply lobbying to make their treatment more humane. I'm not sure that I want to extend to virtuous parents the right to consent to a heart transplant for their children if the donors are children with Down's Syndrome. In another place, I have argued that there is a morally relevant distinction between animals and marginal humans: the marginal humans have suffered a tragedy in becoming the psychological equals of animals--a tragedy that animals have escaped. The sentiments properly evoked by the recognition of such a tragedy--pity and compassion--speak strongly against further injury to someone already so afflicted (1985).

The appeal to the tragedy of marginal cases can acquit the virtuous parent of the charge of arbitrary discrimination in choosing not to do to a retarded human what he/she might do to a normal baboon. Still, he/she is using another as a means to his/her ends. But if we grant the moral significance of parental affections, then the possibility is open that conflicts between partiality and impartiality should sometimes be decided in

partiality's favor.[5]

Notes

1. This argument appears in Devine's 1978.
2. Several short discussions of various aspects of xenograft appear in the February, 1985, Hastings Center Report, grouped under the title, "The Subject Is Baby Fae."
3. Regan discusses the moral significance of relationships with loved ones and friends in section 8.12 of his 1983. However, it is not clear that cases like xenograft would be covered by that discussion: Regan doesn't explicitly allow the appeal to such "special considerations" to justify using otherwise non-threatened subjects of a life as means to ends solely.
4. See Sapontzis' 1980.
5. I'm very grateful to Hilde Robinson for contributions constructive beyond her usual generous measure. I'm also grateful to Myron Anderson, John Bahde, David Soyer, Philip Devine, Alan Soble, Matthias Steup, and Stephen Wagner for participating in a discussion of an earlier draft.

A CHANGING WORLD

Once people played with wolves
And lovers like leopards.
All forest people were almost gods.

Once people sang with wolves
And lovers like morning doves.
Now all forests almost are gone.

Once people slept with wolves
And lovers like winter stare.
All of the gods are almost gone.

Almost gone are all the wolves
The people lovers of the Earth,
And all the gods but one.

The people of the Earth saw God
In all. Now humans see
But one above and not in all.

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